明日出发去美洲大陆最法国的地方之一,准备穿高跟鞋。
明日D san 回纽约恢复体力休养生息。
明日图书馆解密达人带儿子去看瀑布玩。
明日雅致人类学阿姨出门开会,两个礼拜后再召见。
明日楼上日文姐姐将打出博士论文最后一页,告别八年抗战。
众生位移。我只愿张爸爸一路好走平安吉祥。
Wednesday, March 31, 2010
Friday, March 26, 2010
关于混杂
由于无法退选日文课,并被老师规劝:zhong san, zan nan dayo(zhong 同学,残念啊!). 不得以还是天天乖乖去上日文课,听片假名英文和其他种类的日文交相混杂,老师学生完全不以为意。想起本人还没想退选日文课前,参加小班日文辩论,讨论灰常有政治意涵的辩论“农村城市那种生活好”,本来作为高龄学生且以我破碎的日文口语表达,断无取胜可能;结果由于全班都开始讲“英文日文”,我也就不客气,直接开始讲剪刀差、工业化牺牲农村,第三世界农村面对新自由主义帝国主义剥削,居然成为最佳辩手。
今日看完一本日文语言改革的专著(我讲给坐我对面的念日本文学的小gay男生听说,这作者说日文罗马化是进步,日文汉字混在假名里就是反动哎,pp小男生瞪大眼睛,对该反动学术权威表示愤慨和抗议)。唯一有用的部分提到日本现代文学的第一部小说——二葉亭四迷的《浮雲 》。二先生为了尽可能不陷落在中文混杂日文的泥沼里,竟然兴师动众地先用俄文写小说,再翻译成日文。多么执着,多么纯粹。。。
近日,身边发生劲爆蜗居事件。经过时间沉淀,一切水落石出。本人不擅长道德判断,然则没想到对“语言混杂”这件事比“蜗居”状况本身反应还要大。故事男猪脚和女猪脚的对话,经常是:哦,面疙瘩,这是一个好的idea.啊,那个restaraunt的mussel比较不fresh. somehow这件事情就没有办法function了。我就不明白了,你丫说的又不是什么colonoscopy(结肠镜检查), haemodialysis(血液透析)你不会翻的字,装什么洋蒜。我同样不明白的是,为什么混杂对象永远只有英文?你也弄点爪哇语瑞典语斯瓦西里语,实在没文化日文德文法文也行啊,搞得这么赤贫干什么,这“居”“蜗”得比井底之蛙还窝囊。
偶们不是本雅明,不讲Reine Sprache. 任何语言和口音时至今日要来讲纯粹,都是自取其辱。然则以特定姿态,尤其是特定文化资本/姿态讲特定语言,“自我殖民”而完全不自知,留学生从容闳开始留了这么多年了,丢人实在丢大发了,且丢得相当“反历史”。汪蜀黍说得很轻描淡写,有些人啊,要浅薄地指点江山了,就开始讲英文。可是汪蜀黍,指点江山和有语言疟疾的“精英人士”,通常只会英文。
众米国朋友觉得我丫对于“好的idea”之深恶痛绝,虽值得同情但不能完全不解。夷人们的问题是:很多湾湾人民都这么说啊?日文里还就有这么个说法啊?我对于亚洲殖民历史受灾之惨重没有反抗性的解释能力,然而至少中文历经劫难,还能保留、改造成现在这个样子,我等作为基本双语、以中文为母语的准知识分子,如若还天天以如此低下的标准混杂,实在不是一个“好的idea.”
临了,连小gay男眼里的“反动学术权威”都还要追求纯粹的日文,亦即纯粹的被罗马字殖民了的日文;偶们装个“纯粹”还不会么?
今日看完一本日文语言改革的专著(我讲给坐我对面的念日本文学的小gay男生听说,这作者说日文罗马化是进步,日文汉字混在假名里就是反动哎,pp小男生瞪大眼睛,对该反动学术权威表示愤慨和抗议)。唯一有用的部分提到日本现代文学的第一部小说——二葉亭四迷的《浮雲 》。二先生为了尽可能不陷落在中文混杂日文的泥沼里,竟然兴师动众地先用俄文写小说,再翻译成日文。多么执着,多么纯粹。。。
近日,身边发生劲爆蜗居事件。经过时间沉淀,一切水落石出。本人不擅长道德判断,然则没想到对“语言混杂”这件事比“蜗居”状况本身反应还要大。故事男猪脚和女猪脚的对话,经常是:哦,面疙瘩,这是一个好的idea.啊,那个restaraunt的mussel比较不fresh. somehow这件事情就没有办法function了。我就不明白了,你丫说的又不是什么colonoscopy(结肠镜检查), haemodialysis(血液透析)你不会翻的字,装什么洋蒜。我同样不明白的是,为什么混杂对象永远只有英文?你也弄点爪哇语瑞典语斯瓦西里语,实在没文化日文德文法文也行啊,搞得这么赤贫干什么,这“居”“蜗”得比井底之蛙还窝囊。
偶们不是本雅明,不讲Reine Sprache. 任何语言和口音时至今日要来讲纯粹,都是自取其辱。然则以特定姿态,尤其是特定文化资本/姿态讲特定语言,“自我殖民”而完全不自知,留学生从容闳开始留了这么多年了,丢人实在丢大发了,且丢得相当“反历史”。汪蜀黍说得很轻描淡写,有些人啊,要浅薄地指点江山了,就开始讲英文。可是汪蜀黍,指点江山和有语言疟疾的“精英人士”,通常只会英文。
众米国朋友觉得我丫对于“好的idea”之深恶痛绝,虽值得同情但不能完全不解。夷人们的问题是:很多湾湾人民都这么说啊?日文里还就有这么个说法啊?我对于亚洲殖民历史受灾之惨重没有反抗性的解释能力,然而至少中文历经劫难,还能保留、改造成现在这个样子,我等作为基本双语、以中文为母语的准知识分子,如若还天天以如此低下的标准混杂,实在不是一个“好的idea.”
临了,连小gay男眼里的“反动学术权威”都还要追求纯粹的日文,亦即纯粹的被罗马字殖民了的日文;偶们装个“纯粹”还不会么?
Sunday, February 21, 2010
Tuesday, February 9, 2010
Carnegie-log
我很高兴地向大家宣布,我今天听到了个人历史最好版本的马勒一号。我更高兴地向大家宣布,巴伦博伊姆真的是我见识过的指挥马勒的指挥家里,最烂的一个(萨义德爷爷,你的好朋友和马勒真的不搭)。
今天本来是冲着穆特去的,结果发现穿金色礼服的美女小提琴家(她小姐姓Mutter,德文“娘”的意思,哪有姓“娘”的?)原来是整场最木有看头的一位。今晚指挥Manfred Honeck太抢风头。勃拉姆斯的第一乐章,乐队盖过小提琴,且速度偏拖,就是匹兹堡要发飙的前兆。等到真的开始马勒的时候,整个乐队的层次开始以"梵塔诗玛歌莉娅phantasmogoria"的方式渐次堆叠,我第一次了解马勒是一个拥有如何疯狂野心和脆弱内心的热爱贝多芬的“英雄”。他以“神”的方式俯视乐队,每一个乐器都是神的工具。乐手乐章起起伏伏,好像他的提线木偶。我从来没有听马勒听到张嘴微笑;也从来没有听任何人听到长时间起鸡皮疙瘩等待最高潮的降临。指挥Honeck是如此优雅地疯狂,我真的能看见卡内基的顶即将被掀翻。有那么一瞬间,我以为他应该就是阿巴多(回来wiki发现他还真给阿巴多当过学徒)。
我第一次鼓掌鼓到双手发红发痛而后知后觉。卡内基是个好地方。
另:今晚购得卡内基明信片若干,加Horowitz卡内基收藏(我还以为卡内基独家,结果回来发现amazon更便宜。。。)
再另:为避免前段时间发生的想不起来听了什么的悲剧,记录近期卡内基日志如下。
Feburary 9, 2010 at 8pm
Pittsburgh Symphony Orchestra
Manfred Honeck, Music Director and Conductor
Anne-Sophie Mutter, Violin
JOHANNES BRAHMS Violin Concerto in D Major, Op. 77 (1878)
GUSTAV MAHLER Symphony No. 1 in D Major (1884-1888; 1893-1896, ca. 1906)
【太牛,且返场】
January 31, 2010 at 8pm
Chicago Symphony Orchestra
Pierre Boulez, Conductor Emeritus
PIERRE BOULEZ Livre pour cordes (1948-1949; rev. 1968, 1988) (Pierre-Laurent Aimard and Tamara Stefanovich, Piano)
BELA BARTOK Concerto for Two Pianos, Percussion, and Orchestra (1940)
IGOR STRAVINSKY The Firebird (1910-1911)
【Bartok对打击乐的洞见很了不起。Boulez怎么看怎么不像80岁的人。】
January 28, 2010 at 8pm
Houston Symphony
Hans Graf, Music Director and Conductor
The Planets - An Hd Odyssey
IGOR STRAVINSKY Scherzo fantastique, Op. 3 (1907-1908)
HENRI DUTILLEUX Timbres, espace, mouvement, ou la Nuit etoilee (1976-1978; 1990)
GUSTAV HOLST The Planets, Op. 32 (1914-1916)
【Holst的The Planets的多媒体呈现,很有趣。木星那段大家应该最熟。】
November 7, 2009 at 8pm
Atlanta Symphony Orchestra
Robert Spano, Conductor
ANGEL LAM Awakening from a Disappearing Garden (2009; NYC premiere) (Yo-Yo Ma, Cello; Angel Lam, Narrator)
IGOR STRAVINSKY Le Rossigol (The Nightingale) (1908-1909; 1913-1914)
【Angel Lam讲的故事很像聂华苓会写的故事。第一次谒见马友友先生,怎么有这么甜的大提琴?】
October 28, 2009 at 8pm
Juilliard Orchestra
Michael Tilson Thomas, Conductor
LOU HARRISON The Family of the Court, from Pacifika Rondo (1963)
HU LUTING
LV WENCHENG
TRADITIONAL
SUN YIQIANG
CHEN QIGANG Er Huang for Piano and Orchestra (world premiere)
(Lang Lang, piano)
GUSTAV MAHLER Das Lied von der Erde (1908-1909)
【朗朗没劲。陈其钢光头很亮很酷,可惜没有听出二黄来。。。】
今天本来是冲着穆特去的,结果发现穿金色礼服的美女小提琴家(她小姐姓Mutter,德文“娘”的意思,哪有姓“娘”的?)原来是整场最木有看头的一位。今晚指挥Manfred Honeck太抢风头。勃拉姆斯的第一乐章,乐队盖过小提琴,且速度偏拖,就是匹兹堡要发飙的前兆。等到真的开始马勒的时候,整个乐队的层次开始以"梵塔诗玛歌莉娅phantasmogoria"的方式渐次堆叠,我第一次了解马勒是一个拥有如何疯狂野心和脆弱内心的热爱贝多芬的“英雄”。他以“神”的方式俯视乐队,每一个乐器都是神的工具。乐手乐章起起伏伏,好像他的提线木偶。我从来没有听马勒听到张嘴微笑;也从来没有听任何人听到长时间起鸡皮疙瘩等待最高潮的降临。指挥Honeck是如此优雅地疯狂,我真的能看见卡内基的顶即将被掀翻。有那么一瞬间,我以为他应该就是阿巴多(回来wiki发现他还真给阿巴多当过学徒)。
我第一次鼓掌鼓到双手发红发痛而后知后觉。卡内基是个好地方。
另:今晚购得卡内基明信片若干,加Horowitz卡内基收藏(我还以为卡内基独家,结果回来发现amazon更便宜。。。)
再另:为避免前段时间发生的想不起来听了什么的悲剧,记录近期卡内基日志如下。
Feburary 9, 2010 at 8pm
Pittsburgh Symphony Orchestra
Manfred Honeck, Music Director and Conductor
Anne-Sophie Mutter, Violin
JOHANNES BRAHMS Violin Concerto in D Major, Op. 77 (1878)
GUSTAV MAHLER Symphony No. 1 in D Major (1884-1888; 1893-1896, ca. 1906)
【太牛,且返场】
January 31, 2010 at 8pm
Chicago Symphony Orchestra
Pierre Boulez, Conductor Emeritus
PIERRE BOULEZ Livre pour cordes (1948-1949; rev. 1968, 1988) (Pierre-Laurent Aimard and Tamara Stefanovich, Piano)
BELA BARTOK Concerto for Two Pianos, Percussion, and Orchestra (1940)
IGOR STRAVINSKY The Firebird (1910-1911)
【Bartok对打击乐的洞见很了不起。Boulez怎么看怎么不像80岁的人。】
January 28, 2010 at 8pm
Houston Symphony
Hans Graf, Music Director and Conductor
The Planets - An Hd Odyssey
IGOR STRAVINSKY Scherzo fantastique, Op. 3 (1907-1908)
HENRI DUTILLEUX Timbres, espace, mouvement, ou la Nuit etoilee (1976-1978; 1990)
GUSTAV HOLST The Planets, Op. 32 (1914-1916)
【Holst的The Planets的多媒体呈现,很有趣。木星那段大家应该最熟。】
November 7, 2009 at 8pm
Atlanta Symphony Orchestra
Robert Spano, Conductor
ANGEL LAM Awakening from a Disappearing Garden (2009; NYC premiere) (Yo-Yo Ma, Cello; Angel Lam, Narrator)
IGOR STRAVINSKY Le Rossigol (The Nightingale) (1908-1909; 1913-1914)
【Angel Lam讲的故事很像聂华苓会写的故事。第一次谒见马友友先生,怎么有这么甜的大提琴?】
October 28, 2009 at 8pm
Juilliard Orchestra
Michael Tilson Thomas, Conductor
LOU HARRISON The Family of the Court, from Pacifika Rondo (1963)
HU LUTING
LV WENCHENG
TRADITIONAL
SUN YIQIANG
CHEN QIGANG Er Huang for Piano and Orchestra (world premiere)
(Lang Lang, piano)
GUSTAV MAHLER Das Lied von der Erde (1908-1909)
【朗朗没劲。陈其钢光头很亮很酷,可惜没有听出二黄来。。。】
Wednesday, January 13, 2010
The Spectre of dotCommunism
案:《今天》就要发The dotCommunist Manifesto的中文版了。贵校的法学教授Eben Moglen,竟然说要打倒资产阶级法制体系.这不就“反正”了么。
鉴于古歌就要退出贵国(且最直接原因还是贵国知识产权问题以及人权问题,网络时代的知识产权和人权问题),鉴于大家还没有想好怎么反应,全文转帖《信息时代之共产党宣言》。
马克思说了我们要反对资本,尊重劳动,但是没有讲资本主义及其治下的人权中间的关系。什么人贵?哪一国的什么立场的人贵?马爷爷啥也没说。
Moglen先生说了要反对知识产权体系,尊重创意性劳动的自由,但是没有说资本主义跨国公司治下的民族国家的人权应该怎么弄,而该跨国公司和东印度公司或者潘多拉上的“地球打手公司”,到底该有/会有什么区别。
还有:我们“联合”谁去?
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The dotCommunist Manifesto
Eben Moglen*
January 2003
A Spectre is haunting multinational capitalism--the spectre of free information. All the powers of ``globalism'' have entered into an unholy alliance to exorcize this spectre: Microsoft and Disney, the World Trade Organization, the United States Congress and the European Commission.
Where are the advocates of freedom in the new digital society who have not been decried as pirates, anarchists, communists? Have we not seen that many of those hurling the epithets were merely thieves in power, whose talk of ``intellectual property'' was nothing more than an attempt to retain unjustifiable privileges in a society irrevocably changing? But it is acknowledged by all the Powers of Globalism that the movement for freedom is itself a Power, and it is high time that we should publish our views in the face of the whole world, to meet this nursery tale of the Spectre of Free Information with a Manifesto of our own.
Owners and Creators
Throughout the world the movement for free information announces the arrival of a new social structure, born of the transformation of bourgeois industrial society by the digital technology of its own invention.
The history of all hitherto existing societies reveals a history of class struggles.
Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guild-master and journeyman, bourgeois and proletarian, imperialist and subaltern, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that has often ended, either in a revolutionary re-constitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes.
The industrial society that sprouted from the worldwide expansion of European power ushering in modernity did not do away with class antagonisms. It but established new classes, new conditions of oppression, new forms of struggle in place of the old ones. But the epoch of the bourgeoisie simplified the class antagonisms. Society as a whole seemed divided into two great hostile camps, into two great classes, directly facing each other: Bourgeoisie and Proletariat.
But revolution did not by and large occur, and the ``dictatorship of the proletariat,'' where it arose or claimed to arise, proved incapable of instituting freedom. Instead, capitalism was enabled by technology to secure for itself a measure of consent. The modern laborer in the advanced societies rose with the progress of industry, rather than sinking deeper and deeper below the conditions of existence of his own class. Pauperism did not develop more rapidly than population and wealth. Rationalized industry in the Fordist style turned industrial workers not into a pauperized proletariat, but rather into mass consumers of mass production. Civilizing the proletariat became part of the self-protective program of the bourgeoisie.
In this way, universal education and an end to the industrial exploitation of children became no longer the despised program of the proletarian revolutionary, but the standard of bourgeois social morality. With universal education, workers became literate in the media that could stimulate them to additional consumption. The development of sound recording, telephony, moving pictures, and radio and television broadcasting changed the workers' relationship to bourgeois culture, even as it profoundly altered the culture itself.
Music, for example, throughout previous human history was an acutely perishable non-commodity, a social process, occurring in a place and at a time, consumed where it was made, by people who were indistinctly differentiated as consumers and as makers. After the adoption of recording, music was a non-persishable commodity that could be moved long distances and was necessarily alienated from those who made it. Music became, as an article of consumption, an opportunity for its new ``owners'' to direct additional consumption, to create wants on the part of the new mass consuming class, and to drive its demand in directions profitable to ownership. So too with the entirely new medium of the moving picture, which within decades reoriented the nature of human cognition, capturing a substantial fraction of every worker's day for the reception of messages ordering additional consumption. Tens of thousands of such advertisements passed before the eyes of each child every year, reducing to a new form of serfdom the children liberated from tending a productive machine: they were now compulsorily enlisted in tending the machinery of consumption.
Thus the conditions of bourgeois society were made less narrow, better able to comprise the wealth created by them. Thus was cured the absurd epidemic of recurrent over-production. No longer was there too much civilisation, too much means of subsistence, too much industry, too much commerce.
But the bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionising the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society. Constant revolutionising of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones. All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air.
With the adoption of digital technology, the system of mass consumer production supported by mass consumer culture gave birth to new social conditions out of which a new structure of class antagonism precipitates.
The bourgeoisie, by the rapid improvement of all instruments of production, by the immensely facilitated means of communication, draws all, even the most barbarian, nations into civilisation. The cheap prices of its commodities are the heavy artillery with which it batters down all Chinese walls, with which it forces the barbarians' intensely obstinate hatred of foreigners to capitulate. It compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt its culture and its principles of intellectual ownership; it compels them to introduce what it calls civilisation into their midst, i.e., to become bourgeois themselves. In one word, it creates a world after its own image. But the very instruments of its communication and acculturation establish the modes of resistance which are turned against itself.
Digital technology transforms the bourgeois economy. The dominant goods in the system of production--the articles of cultural consumption that are both commodities sold and instructions to the worker on what and how to buy--along with all other forms of culture and knowledge now have zero marginal cost. Anyone and everyone may have the benefit of all works of culture: music, art, literature, technical information, science, and every other form of knowledge. Barriers of social inequality and geographic isolation dissolve. In place of the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, universal inter-dependence of people. And as in material, so also in intellectual production. The intellectual creations of individual people become common property. Modern bourgeois society with its relations of production, of exchange and of property, a society that has conjured up such gigantic means of production and of exchange, is like the sorcerer's apprentice, who is no longer able to control the powers of the nether world whom he has called up by his spells.
With this change, man is at last compelled to face with sober senses his real conditions of life, and his relations with his kind. Society confronts the simple fact that when everyone can possess every intellectual work of beauty and utility--reaping all the human value of every increase of knowledge--at the same cost that any one person can possess them, it is no longer moral to exclude. If Rome possessed the power to feed everyone amply at no greater cost than that of Caesar's own table, the people would sweep Caesar violently away if anyone were left to starve. But the bourgeois system of ownership demands that knowledge and culture be rationed by the ability to pay. Alternative traditional forms, made newly viable by the technology of interconnection, comprising voluntary associations of those who create and those who support, must be forced into unequal competition with ownership's overwhelmingly powerful systems of mass communication. Those systems of mass communication are in turn based on the appropriation of the people's common rights in the electromagnetic spectrum. Throughout the digital society the classes of knowledge workers--artists, musicians, writers, students, technologists and others trying to gain in their conditions of life by copying and modifying information--are radicalized by the conflict between what they know is possible and what the ideology of the bourgeois compels them to accept. Out of that discordance arises the consciousness of a new class, and with its rise to self-consciousness the fall of ownership begins.
The advance of digital society, whose involuntary promoter is the bourgeoisie, replaces the isolation of the creators, due to competition, by their revolutionary combination, due to association. Creators of knowledge, technology, and culture discover that they no longer require the structure of production based on ownership and the structure of distribution based on coercion of payment. Association, and its anarchist model of propertyless production, makes possible the creation of free software, through which creators gain control of the technology of further production.[1] The network itself, freed of the control of broadcasters and other bandwidth owners, becomes the locus of a new system of distribution, based on association among peers without hierarchical control, which replaces the coercive system of distribution for all music, video, and other soft goods. Universities, libraries, and related institutions become allies of the new class, interpreting their historic role as distributors of knowledge to require them to offer increasingly complete access to the knowledge in their stewardship to all people, freely. The liberation of information from the control of ownership liberates the worker from his imposed role as custodian of the machine. Free information allows the worker to invest her time not in the consumption of bourgeois culture, with its increasingly urgent invitations to sterile consumption, but in the cultivation of her mind and her skills. Increasingly aware of her powers of creation, she ceases to be a passive participant in the systems of production and consumption in which bourgeois society entrapped her.
But the bourgeoisie, wherever it has got the upper hand, has put an end to all feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations. It has pitilessly torn asunder the motley feudal ties that bound man to his ``natural superiors,'' and has left remaining no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest, than callous ``cash payment.'' It has drowned the most heavenly ecstasies of religious fervour, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of philistine sentimentalism, in the icy water of egotistical calculation. It has resolved personal worth into exchange value. And in place of the numberless and feasible chartered freedoms, has set up that single, unconscionable freedom--Free Trade. In one word, for exploitation, veiled by religious and political illusions, naked, shameless, direct, brutal exploitation.
Against the forthcoming profound liberation of the working classes, whose access to knowledge and information power now transcends their previous narrow role as consumers of mass culture, the system of bourgeois ownership therefore necessarily contends to its very last. With its preferred instrument of Free Trade, ownership attempts to bring about the very crisis of over-production it once feared. Desperate to entrap the creators in their role as waged consumers, bourgeois ownership attempts to turn material deprivation in some parts of the globe into a source of cheap goods with which to bribe back into cultural passivity not the barbarians, but its own most prized possession--the educated technological laborers of the most advanced societies.
At this stage the workers and creators still form an incoherent mass scattered over the whole globe, and remain broken up by their mutual competition. Now and then the creators are victorious, but only for a time. The real fruit of their battles lies, not in the immediate result, but in the ever-expanding union. This union is helped on by the improved means of communication that are created by modern industry and that place the workers and creators of different localities in contact with one another. It was just this contact that was needed to centralise the numerous local struggles, all of the same character, into one national struggle between classes. But every class struggle is a political struggle. And that union, to attain which the burghers of the Middle Ages, with their miserable highways, required centuries, the modern knowledge workers, thanks to the network, achieve in a few years.
Freedom and Creation
Not only has the bourgeoisie forged the weapons that bring death to itself; it has also called into existence the men who are to wield those weapons--the digital working class--the creators. Possessed of skills and knowledges that create both social and exchange value, resisting reduction to the status of commodity, capable collectively of producing all the technologies of freedom, such workmen cannot be reduced to appendages of the machine. Where once bonds of ignorance and geographical isolation tied the proletarian to the industrial army in which he formed an indistinguishable and disposable component, creators collectively wielding control over the network of human communications retain their individuality, and offer the value of their intellectual labor through a variety of arrangements more favorable to their welfare, and to their freedom, than the system of bourgeois ownership ever conceded them.
But in precise proportion to the success of the creators in establishing the genuinely free economy, the bourgeoisie must reinforce the structure of coercive production and distribution concealed within its supposed preference for ``free markets'' and ``free trade.'' Though ultimately prepared to defend by force arrangements that depend on force, however masked, the bourgeoisie at first attempts the reimposition of coercion through its preferred instrument of compulsion, the institutions of its law. Like the ancien régime in France, which believed that feudal property could be maintained by conservative force of law despite the modernization of society, the owners of bourgeois culture expect their law of property to provide a magic bulwark against the forces they have themselves released.
At a certain stage in the development of the means of production and of exchange, the conditions under which feudal society produced and exchanged, the feudal organisation of agriculture and manufacturing industry, in one word, the feudal relations of property became no longer compatible with the already developed productive forces; they became so many fetters. They had to be burst asunder; they were burst asunder.
Into their place stepped free competition, accompanied by a social and political constitution adapted to it, and by the economic and political sway of the bourgeois class. But ``free competition'' was never more than an aspiration of bourgeois society, which constantly experienced the capitalists' intrinsic preference for monopoly. Bourgeois property exemplified the concept of monopoly, denying at the level of practical arrangements the dogma of freedom bourgeois law inconsistently proclaimed. As, in the new digital society, creators establish genuinely free forms of economic activity, the dogma of bourgeois property comes into active conflict with the dogma of bourgeois freedom. Protecting the ownership of ideas requires the suppression of free technology, which means the suppression of free speech. The power of the State is employed to prohibit free creation. Scientists, artists, engineers and students are prevented from creating or sharing knowledge, on the ground that their ideas imperil the owners' property in the system of cultural production and distribution. It is in the courts of the owners that the creators find their class identity most clearly, and it is there, accordingly, that the conflict begins.
But the law of bourgeois property is not a magic amulet against the consequences of bourgeois technology: the broom of the sorcerer's apprentice will keep sweeping, and the water continues to rise. It is in the domain of technology that the defeat of ownership finally occurs, as the new modes of production and distribution burst the fetters of the outmoded law.
All the preceding classes that got the upper hand, sought to fortify their already acquired status by subjecting society at large to their conditions of appropriation. Knowledge workers cannot become masters of the productive forces of society, except by abolishing their own previous mode of appropriation, and thereby also every other previous mode of appropriation. Theirs is the revolutionary dedication to freedom: to the abolition of the ownership of ideas, to the free circulation of knowledge, and the restoration of culture as the symbolic commons that all human beings share.
To the owners of culture, we say: You are horrified at our intending to do away with private property in ideas. But in your existing society, private property is already done away with for nine-tenths of the population. What they create is immediately appropriated by their employers, who claim the fruit of their intellect through the law of patent, copyright, trade secret and other forms of ``intellectual property.'' Their birthright in the electromagnetic spectrum, which can allow all people to communicate with and learn from one another, freely, at almost inexhaustible capacity for nominal cost, has been taken from them by the bourgeoisie, and is returned to them as articles of consumption--broadcast culture, and telecommunications services--for which they pay dearly. Their creativity finds no outlet: their music, their art, their storytelling is drowned out by the commodities of capitalist culture, amplified by all the power of the oligopoly of ``broadcasting,'' before which they are supposed to remain passive, consuming rather than creating. In short, the property you lament is the proceeds of theft: its existence for the few is solely due to its non-existence in the hands of everyone else. You reproach us, therefore, with intending to do away with a form of property, the necessary condition for whose existence is the non-existence of any such property for the immense majority of society.
It has been objected that upon the abolition of private property in ideas and culture all creative work will cease, for lack of ``incentive,'' and universal laziness will overtake us.
According to this, there ought to have been no music, art, technology, or learning before the advent of the bourgeoisie, which alone conceived of subjecting the entirety of knowledge and culture to the cash nexus. Faced with the advent of free production and free technology, with free software, and with the resulting development of free distribution technology, this argument simply denies the visible and unanswerable facts. Fact is subordinated to dogma, in which the arrangements that briefly characterized intellectual production and cultural distribution during the short heyday of the bourgeoisie are said, despite the evidence of both past and present, to be the only structures possible.
Thus we say to the owners: The misconception that induces you to transform into eternal laws of nature and of reason, the social forms springing from your present mode of production and form of property--historical relations that rise and disappear in the progress of production--this misconception you share with every ruling class that has preceded you. What you see clearly in the case of ancient property, what you admit in the case of feudal property, you are of course forbidden to admit in the case of your own bourgeois form of property.
Our theoretical conclusions are in no way based on ideas or principles that have been invented, or discovered, by this or that would-be universal reformer. They merely express, in general terms, actual relations springing from an existing class struggle, from a historical movement going on under our very eyes.
When people speak of ideas that revolutionise society, they do but express the fact, that within the old society, the elements of a new one have been created, and that the dissolution of the old ideas keeps even pace with the dissolution of the old conditions of existence.
We, the creators of the free information society, mean to wrest from the bourgeoisie, by degrees, the shared patrimony of humankind. We intend the resumption of the cultural inheritance stolen from us under the guise of ``intellectual property,'' as well as the medium of electromagnetic transportation. We are committed to the struggle for free speech, free knowledge, and free technology. The measures by which we advance that struggle will of course be different in different countries, but the following will be pretty generally applicable:
1. Abolition of all forms of private property in ideas.
2. Withdrawal of all exclusive licenses, privileges and rights to use of electromagnetic spectrum. Nullification of all conveyances of permanent title to electromagnetic frequencies.
3. Development of electromagnetic spectrum infrastructure that implements every person's equal right to communicate.
4. Common social development of computer programs and all other forms of software, including genetic information, as public goods.
5. Full respect for freedom of speech, including all forms of technical speech.
6. Protection for the integrity of creative works.
7. Free and equal access to all publicly-produced information and all educational material used in all branches of the public education system.
By these and other means, we commit ourselves to the revolution that liberates the human mind. In overthrowing the system of private property in ideas, we bring into existence a truly just society, in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all.
* Professor of Law, Columbia University Law School.
1 The free software movement has used programmers throughout the world--paid and unpaid--since the early 1980s to create the GNU/Linux operating system and related software that can be copied, modified and redistributed by all its users. This technical environment, now ubiquitous and competitively superior to the proprietary software industry's products, frees computer users from the monopolistic form of technological control that was to have dominated the personal computer revolution as capitalism envisioned it. By displacing the proprietary production of the most powerful monopoly on earth, the free software movement shows that associations of digital workers are capable of producing better goods, for distribution at nominal cost, than capitalist production can achieve despite the vaunted ``incentives'' created by ownership and exclusionary ``intellectual property'' law.
鉴于古歌就要退出贵国(且最直接原因还是贵国知识产权问题以及人权问题,网络时代的知识产权和人权问题),鉴于大家还没有想好怎么反应,全文转帖《信息时代之共产党宣言》。
马克思说了我们要反对资本,尊重劳动,但是没有讲资本主义及其治下的人权中间的关系。什么人贵?哪一国的什么立场的人贵?马爷爷啥也没说。
Moglen先生说了要反对知识产权体系,尊重创意性劳动的自由,但是没有说资本主义跨国公司治下的民族国家的人权应该怎么弄,而该跨国公司和东印度公司或者潘多拉上的“地球打手公司”,到底该有/会有什么区别。
还有:我们“联合”谁去?
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The dotCommunist Manifesto
Eben Moglen*
January 2003
A Spectre is haunting multinational capitalism--the spectre of free information. All the powers of ``globalism'' have entered into an unholy alliance to exorcize this spectre: Microsoft and Disney, the World Trade Organization, the United States Congress and the European Commission.
Where are the advocates of freedom in the new digital society who have not been decried as pirates, anarchists, communists? Have we not seen that many of those hurling the epithets were merely thieves in power, whose talk of ``intellectual property'' was nothing more than an attempt to retain unjustifiable privileges in a society irrevocably changing? But it is acknowledged by all the Powers of Globalism that the movement for freedom is itself a Power, and it is high time that we should publish our views in the face of the whole world, to meet this nursery tale of the Spectre of Free Information with a Manifesto of our own.
Owners and Creators
Throughout the world the movement for free information announces the arrival of a new social structure, born of the transformation of bourgeois industrial society by the digital technology of its own invention.
The history of all hitherto existing societies reveals a history of class struggles.
Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guild-master and journeyman, bourgeois and proletarian, imperialist and subaltern, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that has often ended, either in a revolutionary re-constitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes.
The industrial society that sprouted from the worldwide expansion of European power ushering in modernity did not do away with class antagonisms. It but established new classes, new conditions of oppression, new forms of struggle in place of the old ones. But the epoch of the bourgeoisie simplified the class antagonisms. Society as a whole seemed divided into two great hostile camps, into two great classes, directly facing each other: Bourgeoisie and Proletariat.
But revolution did not by and large occur, and the ``dictatorship of the proletariat,'' where it arose or claimed to arise, proved incapable of instituting freedom. Instead, capitalism was enabled by technology to secure for itself a measure of consent. The modern laborer in the advanced societies rose with the progress of industry, rather than sinking deeper and deeper below the conditions of existence of his own class. Pauperism did not develop more rapidly than population and wealth. Rationalized industry in the Fordist style turned industrial workers not into a pauperized proletariat, but rather into mass consumers of mass production. Civilizing the proletariat became part of the self-protective program of the bourgeoisie.
In this way, universal education and an end to the industrial exploitation of children became no longer the despised program of the proletarian revolutionary, but the standard of bourgeois social morality. With universal education, workers became literate in the media that could stimulate them to additional consumption. The development of sound recording, telephony, moving pictures, and radio and television broadcasting changed the workers' relationship to bourgeois culture, even as it profoundly altered the culture itself.
Music, for example, throughout previous human history was an acutely perishable non-commodity, a social process, occurring in a place and at a time, consumed where it was made, by people who were indistinctly differentiated as consumers and as makers. After the adoption of recording, music was a non-persishable commodity that could be moved long distances and was necessarily alienated from those who made it. Music became, as an article of consumption, an opportunity for its new ``owners'' to direct additional consumption, to create wants on the part of the new mass consuming class, and to drive its demand in directions profitable to ownership. So too with the entirely new medium of the moving picture, which within decades reoriented the nature of human cognition, capturing a substantial fraction of every worker's day for the reception of messages ordering additional consumption. Tens of thousands of such advertisements passed before the eyes of each child every year, reducing to a new form of serfdom the children liberated from tending a productive machine: they were now compulsorily enlisted in tending the machinery of consumption.
Thus the conditions of bourgeois society were made less narrow, better able to comprise the wealth created by them. Thus was cured the absurd epidemic of recurrent over-production. No longer was there too much civilisation, too much means of subsistence, too much industry, too much commerce.
But the bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionising the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society. Constant revolutionising of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones. All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air.
With the adoption of digital technology, the system of mass consumer production supported by mass consumer culture gave birth to new social conditions out of which a new structure of class antagonism precipitates.
The bourgeoisie, by the rapid improvement of all instruments of production, by the immensely facilitated means of communication, draws all, even the most barbarian, nations into civilisation. The cheap prices of its commodities are the heavy artillery with which it batters down all Chinese walls, with which it forces the barbarians' intensely obstinate hatred of foreigners to capitulate. It compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt its culture and its principles of intellectual ownership; it compels them to introduce what it calls civilisation into their midst, i.e., to become bourgeois themselves. In one word, it creates a world after its own image. But the very instruments of its communication and acculturation establish the modes of resistance which are turned against itself.
Digital technology transforms the bourgeois economy. The dominant goods in the system of production--the articles of cultural consumption that are both commodities sold and instructions to the worker on what and how to buy--along with all other forms of culture and knowledge now have zero marginal cost. Anyone and everyone may have the benefit of all works of culture: music, art, literature, technical information, science, and every other form of knowledge. Barriers of social inequality and geographic isolation dissolve. In place of the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, universal inter-dependence of people. And as in material, so also in intellectual production. The intellectual creations of individual people become common property. Modern bourgeois society with its relations of production, of exchange and of property, a society that has conjured up such gigantic means of production and of exchange, is like the sorcerer's apprentice, who is no longer able to control the powers of the nether world whom he has called up by his spells.
With this change, man is at last compelled to face with sober senses his real conditions of life, and his relations with his kind. Society confronts the simple fact that when everyone can possess every intellectual work of beauty and utility--reaping all the human value of every increase of knowledge--at the same cost that any one person can possess them, it is no longer moral to exclude. If Rome possessed the power to feed everyone amply at no greater cost than that of Caesar's own table, the people would sweep Caesar violently away if anyone were left to starve. But the bourgeois system of ownership demands that knowledge and culture be rationed by the ability to pay. Alternative traditional forms, made newly viable by the technology of interconnection, comprising voluntary associations of those who create and those who support, must be forced into unequal competition with ownership's overwhelmingly powerful systems of mass communication. Those systems of mass communication are in turn based on the appropriation of the people's common rights in the electromagnetic spectrum. Throughout the digital society the classes of knowledge workers--artists, musicians, writers, students, technologists and others trying to gain in their conditions of life by copying and modifying information--are radicalized by the conflict between what they know is possible and what the ideology of the bourgeois compels them to accept. Out of that discordance arises the consciousness of a new class, and with its rise to self-consciousness the fall of ownership begins.
The advance of digital society, whose involuntary promoter is the bourgeoisie, replaces the isolation of the creators, due to competition, by their revolutionary combination, due to association. Creators of knowledge, technology, and culture discover that they no longer require the structure of production based on ownership and the structure of distribution based on coercion of payment. Association, and its anarchist model of propertyless production, makes possible the creation of free software, through which creators gain control of the technology of further production.[1] The network itself, freed of the control of broadcasters and other bandwidth owners, becomes the locus of a new system of distribution, based on association among peers without hierarchical control, which replaces the coercive system of distribution for all music, video, and other soft goods. Universities, libraries, and related institutions become allies of the new class, interpreting their historic role as distributors of knowledge to require them to offer increasingly complete access to the knowledge in their stewardship to all people, freely. The liberation of information from the control of ownership liberates the worker from his imposed role as custodian of the machine. Free information allows the worker to invest her time not in the consumption of bourgeois culture, with its increasingly urgent invitations to sterile consumption, but in the cultivation of her mind and her skills. Increasingly aware of her powers of creation, she ceases to be a passive participant in the systems of production and consumption in which bourgeois society entrapped her.
But the bourgeoisie, wherever it has got the upper hand, has put an end to all feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations. It has pitilessly torn asunder the motley feudal ties that bound man to his ``natural superiors,'' and has left remaining no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest, than callous ``cash payment.'' It has drowned the most heavenly ecstasies of religious fervour, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of philistine sentimentalism, in the icy water of egotistical calculation. It has resolved personal worth into exchange value. And in place of the numberless and feasible chartered freedoms, has set up that single, unconscionable freedom--Free Trade. In one word, for exploitation, veiled by religious and political illusions, naked, shameless, direct, brutal exploitation.
Against the forthcoming profound liberation of the working classes, whose access to knowledge and information power now transcends their previous narrow role as consumers of mass culture, the system of bourgeois ownership therefore necessarily contends to its very last. With its preferred instrument of Free Trade, ownership attempts to bring about the very crisis of over-production it once feared. Desperate to entrap the creators in their role as waged consumers, bourgeois ownership attempts to turn material deprivation in some parts of the globe into a source of cheap goods with which to bribe back into cultural passivity not the barbarians, but its own most prized possession--the educated technological laborers of the most advanced societies.
At this stage the workers and creators still form an incoherent mass scattered over the whole globe, and remain broken up by their mutual competition. Now and then the creators are victorious, but only for a time. The real fruit of their battles lies, not in the immediate result, but in the ever-expanding union. This union is helped on by the improved means of communication that are created by modern industry and that place the workers and creators of different localities in contact with one another. It was just this contact that was needed to centralise the numerous local struggles, all of the same character, into one national struggle between classes. But every class struggle is a political struggle. And that union, to attain which the burghers of the Middle Ages, with their miserable highways, required centuries, the modern knowledge workers, thanks to the network, achieve in a few years.
Freedom and Creation
Not only has the bourgeoisie forged the weapons that bring death to itself; it has also called into existence the men who are to wield those weapons--the digital working class--the creators. Possessed of skills and knowledges that create both social and exchange value, resisting reduction to the status of commodity, capable collectively of producing all the technologies of freedom, such workmen cannot be reduced to appendages of the machine. Where once bonds of ignorance and geographical isolation tied the proletarian to the industrial army in which he formed an indistinguishable and disposable component, creators collectively wielding control over the network of human communications retain their individuality, and offer the value of their intellectual labor through a variety of arrangements more favorable to their welfare, and to their freedom, than the system of bourgeois ownership ever conceded them.
But in precise proportion to the success of the creators in establishing the genuinely free economy, the bourgeoisie must reinforce the structure of coercive production and distribution concealed within its supposed preference for ``free markets'' and ``free trade.'' Though ultimately prepared to defend by force arrangements that depend on force, however masked, the bourgeoisie at first attempts the reimposition of coercion through its preferred instrument of compulsion, the institutions of its law. Like the ancien régime in France, which believed that feudal property could be maintained by conservative force of law despite the modernization of society, the owners of bourgeois culture expect their law of property to provide a magic bulwark against the forces they have themselves released.
At a certain stage in the development of the means of production and of exchange, the conditions under which feudal society produced and exchanged, the feudal organisation of agriculture and manufacturing industry, in one word, the feudal relations of property became no longer compatible with the already developed productive forces; they became so many fetters. They had to be burst asunder; they were burst asunder.
Into their place stepped free competition, accompanied by a social and political constitution adapted to it, and by the economic and political sway of the bourgeois class. But ``free competition'' was never more than an aspiration of bourgeois society, which constantly experienced the capitalists' intrinsic preference for monopoly. Bourgeois property exemplified the concept of monopoly, denying at the level of practical arrangements the dogma of freedom bourgeois law inconsistently proclaimed. As, in the new digital society, creators establish genuinely free forms of economic activity, the dogma of bourgeois property comes into active conflict with the dogma of bourgeois freedom. Protecting the ownership of ideas requires the suppression of free technology, which means the suppression of free speech. The power of the State is employed to prohibit free creation. Scientists, artists, engineers and students are prevented from creating or sharing knowledge, on the ground that their ideas imperil the owners' property in the system of cultural production and distribution. It is in the courts of the owners that the creators find their class identity most clearly, and it is there, accordingly, that the conflict begins.
But the law of bourgeois property is not a magic amulet against the consequences of bourgeois technology: the broom of the sorcerer's apprentice will keep sweeping, and the water continues to rise. It is in the domain of technology that the defeat of ownership finally occurs, as the new modes of production and distribution burst the fetters of the outmoded law.
All the preceding classes that got the upper hand, sought to fortify their already acquired status by subjecting society at large to their conditions of appropriation. Knowledge workers cannot become masters of the productive forces of society, except by abolishing their own previous mode of appropriation, and thereby also every other previous mode of appropriation. Theirs is the revolutionary dedication to freedom: to the abolition of the ownership of ideas, to the free circulation of knowledge, and the restoration of culture as the symbolic commons that all human beings share.
To the owners of culture, we say: You are horrified at our intending to do away with private property in ideas. But in your existing society, private property is already done away with for nine-tenths of the population. What they create is immediately appropriated by their employers, who claim the fruit of their intellect through the law of patent, copyright, trade secret and other forms of ``intellectual property.'' Their birthright in the electromagnetic spectrum, which can allow all people to communicate with and learn from one another, freely, at almost inexhaustible capacity for nominal cost, has been taken from them by the bourgeoisie, and is returned to them as articles of consumption--broadcast culture, and telecommunications services--for which they pay dearly. Their creativity finds no outlet: their music, their art, their storytelling is drowned out by the commodities of capitalist culture, amplified by all the power of the oligopoly of ``broadcasting,'' before which they are supposed to remain passive, consuming rather than creating. In short, the property you lament is the proceeds of theft: its existence for the few is solely due to its non-existence in the hands of everyone else. You reproach us, therefore, with intending to do away with a form of property, the necessary condition for whose existence is the non-existence of any such property for the immense majority of society.
It has been objected that upon the abolition of private property in ideas and culture all creative work will cease, for lack of ``incentive,'' and universal laziness will overtake us.
According to this, there ought to have been no music, art, technology, or learning before the advent of the bourgeoisie, which alone conceived of subjecting the entirety of knowledge and culture to the cash nexus. Faced with the advent of free production and free technology, with free software, and with the resulting development of free distribution technology, this argument simply denies the visible and unanswerable facts. Fact is subordinated to dogma, in which the arrangements that briefly characterized intellectual production and cultural distribution during the short heyday of the bourgeoisie are said, despite the evidence of both past and present, to be the only structures possible.
Thus we say to the owners: The misconception that induces you to transform into eternal laws of nature and of reason, the social forms springing from your present mode of production and form of property--historical relations that rise and disappear in the progress of production--this misconception you share with every ruling class that has preceded you. What you see clearly in the case of ancient property, what you admit in the case of feudal property, you are of course forbidden to admit in the case of your own bourgeois form of property.
Our theoretical conclusions are in no way based on ideas or principles that have been invented, or discovered, by this or that would-be universal reformer. They merely express, in general terms, actual relations springing from an existing class struggle, from a historical movement going on under our very eyes.
When people speak of ideas that revolutionise society, they do but express the fact, that within the old society, the elements of a new one have been created, and that the dissolution of the old ideas keeps even pace with the dissolution of the old conditions of existence.
We, the creators of the free information society, mean to wrest from the bourgeoisie, by degrees, the shared patrimony of humankind. We intend the resumption of the cultural inheritance stolen from us under the guise of ``intellectual property,'' as well as the medium of electromagnetic transportation. We are committed to the struggle for free speech, free knowledge, and free technology. The measures by which we advance that struggle will of course be different in different countries, but the following will be pretty generally applicable:
1. Abolition of all forms of private property in ideas.
2. Withdrawal of all exclusive licenses, privileges and rights to use of electromagnetic spectrum. Nullification of all conveyances of permanent title to electromagnetic frequencies.
3. Development of electromagnetic spectrum infrastructure that implements every person's equal right to communicate.
4. Common social development of computer programs and all other forms of software, including genetic information, as public goods.
5. Full respect for freedom of speech, including all forms of technical speech.
6. Protection for the integrity of creative works.
7. Free and equal access to all publicly-produced information and all educational material used in all branches of the public education system.
By these and other means, we commit ourselves to the revolution that liberates the human mind. In overthrowing the system of private property in ideas, we bring into existence a truly just society, in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all.
* Professor of Law, Columbia University Law School.
1 The free software movement has used programmers throughout the world--paid and unpaid--since the early 1980s to create the GNU/Linux operating system and related software that can be copied, modified and redistributed by all its users. This technical environment, now ubiquitous and competitively superior to the proprietary software industry's products, frees computer users from the monopolistic form of technological control that was to have dominated the personal computer revolution as capitalism envisioned it. By displacing the proprietary production of the most powerful monopoly on earth, the free software movement shows that associations of digital workers are capable of producing better goods, for distribution at nominal cost, than capitalist production can achieve despite the vaunted ``incentives'' created by ownership and exclusionary ``intellectual property'' law.
Friday, December 18, 2009
《东京奏鸣曲》,还是恐怖片(剧透)
就像所有作业拖太久都会没有力气完成,这篇部落格想写成“保存条目”时的样貌,算是没戏了。
只是我还是想说明,初看完《东京奏鸣曲》的不理解。为什么陈文茜小姐会在节目里把这部电影描摹成黑泽清转型之温情款款家庭伦理剧?为什么这部电影的重点会被定位成经济危机后的日本家庭的吊诡?为什么还有豆瓣评论热诚地赞美《东京奏鸣曲》承接的是《东京故事》的衣钵?如果是对电影标题的移情,那与其说《东京奏鸣曲》像小津的《东京故事》,不如说像伯格曼的《秋天奏鸣曲》,残酷得更赤裸裸。
是,这是质问父权的作品。没错,这是拷问殖民架构作为岛国国格的作品。当然,小津的痕迹因镜头而明确,剪辑有纪录片的力度,黑泽清具有相当品味的叙事风格。但是问题的症结在于:这个故事是什么故事?
这是一家四口莫名其妙遭受重创并获得救赎的故事。这也是一个岛国莫名其妙遭受重创并获得救赎的故事。我没有办法不做寓言式阅读。片中,香川照之的大儿子就明明白白翻译战后日本的政治寓言;片外,香川照之在经过《鬼子来了》“启蒙”后,亦对战争中的日本国民性进行寓言式阅读。
大量豆瓣评论都指出电影前后两部分的断裂。确实在表述完经济崩溃、父权尽失和殖民焦虑后,要获得救赎只能仰赖超现实叙事(这何尝不是惊悚片的必要配件?)。香川照之一家子在各自的魔幻世界里,全部重生了。
大儿子坦承日本的和平由美军保管,坚信入侵中东是为了全世界的幸福。然而这个全面拥抱殖民主义和帝国主义的帅哥儿子,在美军识时务地缩小战争规模时,及时地在家信里以语焉不详的方式向全家宣布自己的解放——美国虽然不见得都对,但他要留在中东,以国际主义的胸怀帮助战后人民重建,“寻找真正的幸福”。不仅她娘梦见的战争后遗症PTSD没有折磨他,他甚至丝毫没有对战争的恐惧和反省,完全不怀疑自己的“在场”到底是因了何种伟大的“全世界的幸福”,以至于他的新国际主义救赎话语,变成了不知道从哪里来的天外飞仙。而此刻读信的小泉今日子和她在商场清理大理石地面的先生,也已然从危机里浴火重生了。小泉今日子在影帝强盗自杀后,从海边走回家,晨光以照耀女神的方式点亮她的美丽,于是她“人生如梦、一切从头”的愿望就此达成;而香川照之以极大的敬业精神撞完天桥上若干箱子,倒地、爬起,他说:我想重新开始,于是他被面包车撞翻在马路崖子,成就了他重新出现在他家的饭桌边的奇迹。但是,最令人不可思议的救赎和希望,发生在钢琴天才小儿子身上。一个早慧无辜才华盖世的小帅哥,由于跳票被抓近牢里莫名其妙关一夜,翌日安全回到家,开始他四个月的钢琴集训。最终,德彪西的《月光》在他的演绎之下,有如彗星横空出世,震慑每一个人。世界安静,只听得到天才家庭安然迈向新生活的脚步。世界如此安静,片尾都没有音乐配字幕。我们,和所有那一刻的见证者一样,只能被震慑。
这是一个超克的故事。一个超克家长制、超克资本主义经济循环、超克日本经济泡沫、超克美帝侵略、超克二战后的受害者身份、超克二战的加害人身份、超克近代的故事。从1942年的京都那场关于“近代的超克”的研讨会开始,近代和超克的焦虑就已经发声。时至今日,在尝试过军国主义和大东亚共荣圈(作为欧洲民族国家的另类想象)失败后,以什么方式超克?还是不知道。这是历史命题。一个被Harry Harootunian在Overcome by Modernity里诊断为虚无的伪问题。因为近代除了超克,什么都不是。想要超克“超克”本身,终究一场空。我们能做的是且只能是被超克。
对我来说真正可怕的不是想要超克的欲望,也不是不知道具体超克的路径,而是希望什么都没发生,一切可以重来,“因为我们是天才”的姿态。难道不是吗?《东京奏鸣曲》之恐怖,在于几乎每一个角色都要求“重来”,甚至那位神经质的影帝强盗。唯一没有开口要第二次机会的就是月光天才。一切不需解释,振聋发聩的天才将承担所有的历史之名。如此暴力、反历史的历史观,竟然以极度美学的方式呈现。阿多诺会说:这是法西斯政治和美学的连体同声。
说到底,黑泽清还是惊悚片导演。说到底,《东京奏鸣曲》还是惊悚片一部。
Sunday, December 13, 2009
杨德昌的声音
近日托本科生小朋友们的福,听到杨德昌的声音。Criterion Collection的《一一》里,附杨先生和影评人Tony Rayns的同声评论。冷峻愤怒的杨德昌,竟然是如此温暖乐天的音质。非常美国的口音,轻微口急,认真组织自己的句子,也会为自己的笑话得意大笑。那场和廖女士一起出境的音乐会,漫溢夫妇的默契和幸福。杨导演要求太太入镜,太太也要求杨导演上场。杨先生欣然应允,录下太太弹琴姿态,躲在琴后努力模仿。是谓夫唱妇随之锦瑟齐鸣。
附上杨德昌解释《一一》主旨。
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes from Edward Yang:
On the Title:
Few things in life are as simple as ones and twos. I remember that back in the 1980s, the French newspaper Liberation posed a simple question to filmmakers all around the world for a special Cannes supplement. The question was: “Pourquoi filmez-vous?” My one-line answer was just about as simple as the question: “So I don’t have to speak so much.”
The best thing a director can say should probably be found inside the film he has made, not on the page. This film is very much as simple as the ones and twos in life. I’d like viewers to come away from the film with an impression of having been with a simple friend. If they came away with the impression of having encountered “a filmmaker,” then I’d have to consider the film a failure.
The film is simply about life, portrayed across a spectrum of its span. In my view as the writer, simplicity is what’s at the bottom of the whole lot of complications at the top. Therefore the Chinese title of the film is Yi Yi, which literally translates to “one-one,” and “one-one” means “individually” in Chinese. This signifies the film’s portrayal of life through each individual member at each representing age, from birth to death. “A one and a two and a… ” is what’s always muttered by jazz musicians before a jam session. This is where the English title of the film came from, to signify that what’s following the title is not something tense or heavy or stressful. Life should be like a jazzy tune.
附上杨德昌解释《一一》主旨。
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes from Edward Yang:
On the Title:
Few things in life are as simple as ones and twos. I remember that back in the 1980s, the French newspaper Liberation posed a simple question to filmmakers all around the world for a special Cannes supplement. The question was: “Pourquoi filmez-vous?” My one-line answer was just about as simple as the question: “So I don’t have to speak so much.”
The best thing a director can say should probably be found inside the film he has made, not on the page. This film is very much as simple as the ones and twos in life. I’d like viewers to come away from the film with an impression of having been with a simple friend. If they came away with the impression of having encountered “a filmmaker,” then I’d have to consider the film a failure.
The film is simply about life, portrayed across a spectrum of its span. In my view as the writer, simplicity is what’s at the bottom of the whole lot of complications at the top. Therefore the Chinese title of the film is Yi Yi, which literally translates to “one-one,” and “one-one” means “individually” in Chinese. This signifies the film’s portrayal of life through each individual member at each representing age, from birth to death. “A one and a two and a… ” is what’s always muttered by jazz musicians before a jam session. This is where the English title of the film came from, to signify that what’s following the title is not something tense or heavy or stressful. Life should be like a jazzy tune.
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